Criminal Law

The article’s impact on Criminal Law practice highlights a global shift in the intersection of technology and judicial discretion, particularly at critical decision points like bail, sentencing, and parole. In the US, algorithmic risk tools have gained traction in jurisdictions like New York and California, often integrated into bail reform initiatives under statutory frameworks that permit—or even mandate—their use, raising questions about due process and transparency. In South Korea, the adoption of algorithmic assessments remains nascent, largely constrained by constitutional safeguards emphasizing procedural fairness and the primacy of judicial discretion, reflecting a cultural and legal preference for human oversight. Internationally, jurisdictions like the UK and Canada exhibit a hybrid model, permitting algorithmic input while mandating judicial review and disclosure of algorithmic criteria, thereby attempting to balance efficiency with accountability. The article’s critique of proprietary opacity—where algorithmic bias and lack of transparency impede judicial and offender understanding—resonates across all systems, yet its legal implications vary: in the US, it may trigger constitutional challenges under the Sixth Amendment; in Korea, it may invoke constitutional protections under Article 10; and internationally, it may inform evolving jurisprudence on algorithmic accountability under regional human rights frameworks. Thus, while the phenomenon is universal, the legal response is distinctly jurisdictional, shaped by constitutional norms, procedural traditions, and institutional capacity.

This article implicates practitioners by signaling a shift in criminal procedure from traditional human discretion to algorithmic decision-making, raising critical issues of transparency and accountability. Practitioners should be vigilant about the potential for proprietary algorithms to obscure risk calculations, potentially impacting due process and the principle of individualized justice. Statutorily, this intersects with legislative frameworks governing judicial discretion and regulatory concerns over algorithmic bias, such as emerging guidelines on AI use in legal systems (e.g., EU AI Act provisions). Case law may evolve as courts confront challenges to algorithmic influence on bail, sentencing, or parole decisions, particularly where opacity compromises the ability to challenge or verify risk assessments.

The articles in Volume 105, Issue 6 of the Law Review illuminate nuanced intersections between criminal law and systemic justice, particularly through the lens of peremptory challenges and criminalization. The debate on peremptory eliminations, as examined by Harawa and Jolly, underscores evolving standards in jury selection, with implications for equity in criminal proceedings. In comparative perspective, U.S. jurisprudence increasingly confronts racial bias in discretionary practices, aligning with international trends that scrutinize procedural fairness under human rights frameworks—though Korea’s approach remains more deferential to judicial discretion, while international bodies advocate for codified anti-discrimination mandates. Meanwhile, Koh’s critique of criminalization invites a broader examination of prosecutorial power, resonating with global dialogues on overreach, particularly in cybercrime and foreign affairs prosecutions. Collectively, these contributions foster a richer dialogue on criminal law’s role in advancing justice, balancing doctrinal evolution with systemic critique.

The article collection implicates practitioners in white-collar and criminal law by intersecting systemic issues with regulatory and statutory frameworks. For instance, in **Contested Criminalization** (Koh, p. 1799), the discussion on criminalization aligns with statutory interpretations of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, echoing precedents like **Batson v. Kentucky** (1986) regarding peremptory challenges. Similarly, **By Any Means Necessary** (Bhaskar, p. 2011) connects Title II of the ADA to criminal accountability, invoking the statutory obligations under the ADA and aligning with **Olmstead v. L.C.** (1999), which mandates reasonable accommodations. Practitioners must recognize these intersections as they navigate criminal liability, particularly in cases involving systemic bias or regulatory violations. The broader implications emphasize the need for vigilance in applying legal principles to evolving societal contexts.

**Jurisdictional Comparison and Analytical Commentary** The article's examination of juvenile transfer legislation in the United States highlights the need for a more nuanced approach to addressing the unique needs and capacities of youthful offenders. In contrast, the Korean legal system has implemented measures to protect the rights of juvenile defendants, such as the Juvenile Act of 2000, which emphasizes rehabilitation and reintegration into society. Internationally, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) sets forth guidelines for the treatment of juvenile offenders, emphasizing their right to special protection and care. A comparative analysis of the US, Korean, and international approaches reveals distinct differences in the handling of juvenile transfer legislation. While the US Supreme Court has acknowledged the unique capacity for rehabilitation of youth, its jurisprudence has been limited to specific areas, such as sentencing juveniles to life without parole. In contrast, the Korean Juvenile Act has taken a more comprehensive approach, mandating that juvenile courts prioritize rehabilitation and reintegration. Internationally, the CRC has established a framework for the protection of juvenile rights, including the right to special protection and care. The implications of this analysis are significant, as it highlights the need for a more expansive application of the constitutional prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment with respect to juvenile defendants. By examining the more subtle dangers of transfer legislation, this article promotes a more nuanced understanding of the unique needs and capacities of youthful offenders. This, in turn, may inform policy reforms in the US and other jurisdictions,

As a White Collar Crime Expert, I must note that the article's focus on juvenile transfer legislation and its implications for constitutional protections may seem unrelated to my area of expertise. However, the discussion of the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence and the application of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment has implications for practitioners in the field of white-collar crime. In the context of white-collar crime, the concept of mens rea, or the mental state required for criminal liability, is crucial. The idea that juveniles may be subject to harsher punishments due to their age raises questions about the capacity for mens rea and the potential for rehabilitation. This is particularly relevant in white-collar crime cases, where the perpetrator's mental state and capacity for rehabilitation may be key factors in determining guilt and sentencing. The article's discussion of the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence in cases such as Miller v. Alabama (2012) and Jones v. Mississippi (2020) highlights the importance of considering the unique characteristics of juveniles in the context of criminal law. In the realm of white-collar crime, practitioners may draw parallels with the concept of "youthful offender" status, which can impact sentencing and rehabilitation. In terms of statutory and regulatory connections, the article's discussion of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment has implications for the federal sentencing guidelines, which take into account the defendant's age and potential for rehabilitation. Additionally, the article's focus on